Islamic divorce in the English courts: human rights and sharia law by Jones, Alistair
Islamic	divorce	in	the	English	courts:	human	rights
and	sharia	law
As	the	majority	of	Muslim	marriages	in	England	are	not	legally	recognised,	women	are	in	a
particularly	vulnerable	position	should	those	marriages	break	down.	However,	in	one	recent	case	a
novel	judgment	has	opened	the	door	for	the	wife	to	seek	some	financial	recourse.	Alistair
Jones	perceives	this	to	be	a	significant	development,	yet	he	also	stresses	that	legal	solutions	have
their	limits	and	that	theological	reform	is	ultimately	required	if	a	lasting	solution	is	to	be	found.
The	majority	of	Muslim	marriages	in	England	would	not	be	recognised	in	the	English	courts.
Typically,	Muslim	couples	celebrate	a	traditional	Nikah	marriage	ceremony	but	often	they	do	not	then	go	on	to
register	the	marriage	as	a	civil	marriage.	According	to	one	survey	from	2014,	as	many	as	9	out	of	10	women	in	some
parts	of	the	UK	have	‘Nikah-only’	marriages.	These	marriages	have	religious	meaning	but	no	legal	status.	They	exist
in	sharia	law,	but	not	in	English	civil	law.
The	consequences	may	be	drastic	if	the	marriages	fall	apart.	A	Muslim	woman	who	has	had	a	Nikah-only	marriage
and	divorces	won’t	be	able	to	go	to	the	family	court	for	maintenance	and	a	share	of	the	family	home.	She	is	likely	to
be	advised	by	a	lawyer	that	she	was,	in	effect,	never	married	in	the	eyes	of	English	law.	She	would	have	no	more
rights	than	a	girlfriend	and	so	may	well	be	left	without	any	financial	support.
For	a	few	years,	Muslims,	feminists,	secularists	and	others	have	been	drawing	attention	to	this	hardship.	Earlier	this
year	the	Home	Office	published	a	review	which	addressed	the	issue.	The	principal	recommendation	was	that	legal
changes	should	be	introduced	to	ensure	that	Muslim	couples	also	register	their	marriages	as	civil	marriages.	The	aim
was	to	protect	women	in	Nikah-only	marriages.	But	legislative	change	has	not	yet	followed	and	it	is	worth	wondering
if	it	will.
In	the	meantime,	an	interesting	legal	development	for	married	Muslim	women	in	England	did	come	about	a	few
weeks	ago.	It	was	little	noticed,	but	may	have	more	effect	than	the	review.	It	took	the	form	of	a	judgement	handed
down	by	Mr	Justice	Williams	in	the	family	court	in	London,	in	the	case	of	Nasreen	Akhter	v	Mohammed	Shabaz
Khan.
When	Nasreen	Akhter	petitioned	for	divorce,	her	husband’s	defence	was	predictable.	He	said	they	had	never	entered
a	marriage	that	was	valid	according	to	English	law.	Indeed,	a	Nikah	had	been	celebrated	at	TKC	Chowdury’s
restaurant	in	Southall	but,	he	said,	the	marriage	existed	only	in	sharia	law.	Therefore	a	divorce	in	the	English	courts
was	just	a	legal	impossibility.	His	wife	was	entitled	to	nothing.
The	court	agreed	with	the	husband	that	the	marriage	was	not	valid.	However,	instead	of	simply	declaring	that	the
marriage	was	(in	the	chilling	phrase)	a	“non-marriage”,	Mr	Justice	Williams	then	took	a	different	tack.	He	found	that	it
was	“void”	for	the	purposes	of	section	11	of	the	Matrimonial	Causes	Act	1973.	To	a	non-lawyer,	the	difference
between	a	“non-marriage”	and	a	“void”	marriage	is	likely	to	sound	like	splitting	hairs.	In	fact,	it	is	crucial.
A	“non-marriage”	never	existed.	Such	a	marriage	is	treated	as	though	it	was	some	other	kind	of	relationship:
boyfriend	and	girlfriend,	partners	or	what-have-you.	A	person	in	a	“void”	marriage	can,	by	contrast,	still	apply	to	the
court	to	deal	with	maintenance	and	to	divide	assets	like	the	family	home.	By	saying	that	a	Nikah-only	marriage	was
“void”,	the	judge	gave	the	wife	some	of	the	same	rights	as	a	couple	who	had	been	validly	married	all	along,	even
though	the	marriage	had	never	been	registered.
Mr	Justice	Williams’	judgement	was	surprising.	How	did	we	get	here?	It	was	through	a	novel	application	of	human
rights	law.	The	judge	interpreted	the	right	to	respect	for	one’s	“private	and	family	life”	(Article	8	of	the	European
Convention)	in	an	expansive	way	to	grant	the	wife	her	petition.	This	kind	of	ruling	is	possible	because	of	the	way	that
rights	under	the	European	Convention	are	interpreted.	The	Convention	is	understood	as	a	“living	instrument”	which
must	be	interpreted	“in	the	light	of	present	day	conditions”.	To	put	it	crudely,	a	judge	may	derive	new	law	from	an
“interpretation”	of	the	very	broad	convention	rights.
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The	decision	represents	a	bold	step	in	the	protection	of	Muslim	women	who	might	otherwise	find	themselves
abandoned	and	penniless.	All	the	same,	the	judgement	has	its	problems.	The	position	of	women	in	Nikah-only
marriages	remains	far	from	certain.	The	judge	decided	this	case	“on	its	particular	facts”.	That	means	not	everyone	in
a	similar	predicament	can	expect	the	same	treatment.	Much	will	depend	on	the	circumstances.	The	bigger	question
is	whether	it	is	desirable	for	a	judge	to	make	this	kind	of	decision.	You	may	agree	with	the	decision	but	disagree
about	the	way	it	was	made.
Mr	Justice	Williams	may	have	altered	a	key	notion	of	Islamic	marriage	in	England.	Traditionally,	a	Muslim	husband
may	repudiate	his	wife	without	any	reference	to	a	legal	tribunal.	In	many	Islamic	traditions,	a	man	has	only	to	say	“I
divorce	you”	three	times	in	order	to	obtain	a	divorce	(a	Talaq).	If	Mr	Justice	Williams’	judgement	has	wider
application,	a	Talaq	would	no	longer	be	possible.
If	certain	religious	practices	are	deemed	to	be	unacceptable,	who	should	say	so?	Decisions	made	in	the	High	Court
are	made	by	a	single	legal	professional	acting	on	his	or	her	own.	Do	we	want	a	solitary	judge	to	decide	difficult	and
rangey	questions	of	public	policy?
Parliament	would	be	the	more	natural	forum.	Laws	that	pass	through	Parliament	are	given	the	kind	of	scrutiny	that	a
judge	could	never	give.	They	involve	democratic	accountability	and	policy	considerations	that	are	much	broader	than
can	feature	in	the	necessarily	narrow	process	of	litigation.	Politicians	should	not	abandon	matters	of	significant	public
policy	to	the	courts	which	aren’t	equipped	to	deal	with	them.
But	perhaps	neither	Parliament	nor	the	courts	are	the	main	answer.	Not	every	decision	is	primarily	a	decision	for	law-
makers.	The	state	has	a	duty	to	protect	the	vulnerable,	but	the	law	also	has	its	limits.	Islamic	teaching	on	divorce	is	a
matter	of	theology.	These	days	theology	is	regarded	as	an	irrelevance.	It	is	a	bit	of	a	Cinderella	subject.	But	the
particulars	of	faith	can	only	be	reordered	in	the	language	of	a	living	tradition.	The	fundamental	issue	is	a	question	of
what	should	be	taught	about	divine	truth	and	human	traditions.
____________
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